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1. Introduction 
 
In this study, the foreign policy Operational Code of Xi Jinping, President of the People’s 
Republic of China, is analyzed throughout four phases in his political career: the pre-
presidential phase; his first thirteen months in office; the period directly following two foreign 
policy crises in the summer of 2014; and the year-long period starting January 1, 2017. The 
comparison of these different time periods allows for detecting effects of role change and 
short-term and long-term effects of exogenous shock on an individual leader’s belief system, 
in order to contribute to the theory on belief stability. In the first section, the importance of 
studying leaders’ beliefs in international relations is outlined. Next, the theoretical work 
surrounding belief system stability is presented in the context of the Operational Code. The 
Method section entails the structure of the quantitative content analysis employed in this 
study, the outcomes of which are presented in the Results section. This study concludes by 
linking the results of this study back to the theory of belief stability in the Discussion & 
Conclusion, providing new insights for future scholars to ascertain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Michael D. Young of Social Science Automation, 
Inc. for providing the spreadsheet used to calculate the Operational Code indices not provided by 
ProfilerPlus, and to the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Beijing for the provided 
assistance in the search for useable materials. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Contemporary International Relations (IR) literature revolves mostly around the actor-general 
approach, which regards all decision-making units, be it states, individuals or groups, as 
unitary rational actors whose behavior can be predicted (Hudson, 2005, p.2). However, 
ignoring the role of the individual in history is a serious neglect by IR scholars, who have 
instead emphasized impersonal factors in their explanations of political events (Byman & 
Pollack, 2001, p.108). Individuals, including political decision-makers, do not base their 
actions and behavior solely on rational decision-making. Humans are subject to bias, 
emotions, perceptions, and vast amounts of other internal and external influences (Mintz, 
2007, p.158). Alex Mintz (2007) argues that IR research includes both rational choice and 
behavioral paradigms, and advocates the combination of rational choice and political 
psychology into an overarching theory, namely that of Behavioral IR. Behavioral IR scholars 
assume individuals to possess bounded rationality, meaning that they are influenced by their 
beliefs that shape their perception of reality, and therefore allow for biased behavior instead of 
the optimizing behavior assumed in rational choice theory (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p.6). 
Because of the inability of rational choice theorists to correctly explain and predict behavior 
due to their focus on the system level, cognitive theories of behavior and political psychology 
have gained ground (Herrmann, 1988, p.177). The shift in focus from states to human beings, 
who comprise the foundation of states, would narrow the gap between theory and practice in 
IR (Mintz, 2007, pp.166-167). Policymakers tend to prefer models that illustrate differences 
in behavioral patterns between each state, and each individual leader, examined (Hermann & 
Hagan, 1998, p.130). 
 The assumption made by political scientists, who argue that the role of the individual 
in shaping international politics holds little significance, is contested in the actor-specific 
approach. Human behavior is not assumed to be a constant because individuals possess a vast 
variety of traits that constitute our personality and framework for interpreting our 
environments (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p.112).  Because human decision-makers acting 
singly or in groups constitute all interaction between states, understanding how these 
individuals perceive, and help shape, their environments should be regarded as the ground of 
IR (Hudson, 2005). The influence of individual leaders in shaping foreign policy should 
therefore be considered as a crucial explaining factor in IR. Leaders do not only help shape 
domestic action, behavior and strategy, but they also determine the foreign policy agenda, 
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form alliances and elicit reactions by other nations (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p.109). Due to 
governments’ increasing recognition of the importance of knowing who rules in other states, 
knowing how leaders perceive the intentions and attitudes of their foreign counterparts has 
increased in significance (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, pp.133-134). Hermann et al. (2001) 
check for the effect of having a single, predominant leader as the authoritative decision-
making unit in determining the influence of the person in charge on foreign policy setting. 
They determine that political leaders are motivated by both their internal focus, such as an 
ideology or specific set of interests, and by their perceived relationship to others in their 
environment. Differences in leadership styles result in different foreign policy outcomes, 
depending on perception of the current political situation, the political environment, and 
political timing. (Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001, p.94; pp.119-120). Because 
differences in personalities account for differences in policy outcomes, we cannot treat the 
decision-unit as exogenous in foreign policy analysis. Therefore, George (1969, p.191) argues 
that the beliefs and belief systems of decision-makers provide norms, standards, and 
guidelines that assist actors in determining strategy and tactics. 
 Beliefs assume a central role within the context of cognitive theory. Simply put, 
beliefs can be regarded as that which we hold to be true about the way the world operates 
(Renshon, 2008, p.822). George proposes that beliefs “serve [..] as a prism that influences the 
actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates 
of particular situations” (George, 1969, p.191). Specifically, George argues that leaders’ 
beliefs regarding the nature of politics and political conflict, their views on the ability to 
influence historical development, and their perceptions of correct strategy and tactics make up 
a significant part of an individual’s held beliefs concerning politics (George, 1969, p.197). 
Rosenberg classified these specific beliefs as being a “core set” of beliefs, which he termed 
Weltanschauung. These core beliefs can be seen as the center of a spider web, from which 
other strands of beliefs emanate (Rosenberg, 1986, pp.735-736).  
 So why do beliefs matter in the field of IR? As mentioned before, beliefs shape our 
perception of reality. Holsti (1962) argues that the relationship between belief systems, 
perceptions and decision-making is a vital one. Actors do not act on the hand of an 
“objective” reality, but rather engage in their “image” of the situation, as steered by their 
belief systems. A useful definition of images is offered by Holsti, as “all the accumulated, 
organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world” (Holsti, 1962, p.245). 
Both George (1969, p.191) and Walker (1977, p.131) note that belief systems do not 
necessarily determine decision-making, but nevertheless exert sizeable influence over the 
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choice of tactics and strategy. Additionally, beliefs are still assumed to be crucial factors in 
explaining both behavior and foreign policy setting by leaders when the provided information 
is incoherent to such an extent that information processing becomes cognitively challenging 
(Holsti, 1976, p.20). However, assumptions on how belief systems react to new information 
that does not fit into preexisting beliefs differ in scope. Scholars on the subject are largely 
divided amongst two camps. The first camp exists of those who assume that new information 
is altered to fit into our preexisting beliefs, thereby advocating the relative stability of beliefs 
systems (George, 1969; Holsti, 1967; Jervis, 1976). Scholars from the other camp contest this 
assumption. They argue that leaders’ belief systems adapt to new incoming information, and 
do so in response to changes in the international system (Levy 1994; Walker & Schafer, 2000; 
Schafer & Crichlow, 2000; Feng, 2005; Malici & Malici, 2005; Malici, 2006; Renshon, 
2008). Beliefs, belief systems and the stability of beliefs are all factors that play a crucial role 
in Alexander George’s Operational Code construct (1969). This approach merits its own 
section in this study, and the theoretical work on belief stability is further explored in the 
Theoretical Framework. 
As the discussion above shows, beliefs exercise influence on the construction of 
foreign policy. Beliefs are, in turn, influenced by our intrinsic cognition (Hermann, 1990, 
p.10). However, contemporary literature on belief systems show that there is still a lack of 
understanding in whether belief systems are relatively stable, or whether they are subject to 
change, over time (Renshon, 2008, pp.822-825). Some important questions concerning belief 
stability are still left for scholars to provide conclusive answers to. Do our beliefs change 
through our experiences? In what way do beliefs change? What experiences induce change in 
our belief systems? Levy (1994) charges scholars concerned with belief change to conduct 
longitudinal studies on individual leaders in order to “determine whether [..] variation in 
beliefs is correlated with political position, institutional role, or economic interests” (Levy, 
1994, p.308). In order to shed some light on these questions, and to contribute to the 
discussion on belief stability, this study will focus on testing the stability of belief systems by 
comparing, longitudinally, the Operational Code beliefs of Xi Jinping, president of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), in the context of his experienced role change, as well as 
exogenous shock in the form of two foreign policy crises that occurred in 2014. The 
experienced role change entails Xi’s shift from vice-president to president of the PRC in 
March 2013. The exogenous shocks entail two foreign policy crises experienced by China in 
2014: the Oil Rig Crisis with Vietnam from May to July, and the P-8 Incident with the United 
States in August. To increase our understanding of foreign policy decision-making, Feng 
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(2005, p.653) advocates the importance of detecting change and continuity in leaders’ 
Operational Code beliefs. This study will attempt to identify changes due to learning effects 
of role change and exogenous shock on Xi’s Operational Code beliefs in order to see how this 
contributes to the discussion on belief stability. The research question that I will attempt to 
answer using Operational Code analysis is as follows: 
What are the direct effects of role change, and the short-term and long-term effects of 
exogenous shock on a political leader’s belief system? 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
    
In this study, the issue of belief stability is approached through Operational Code analysis. 
The Operational Code is a systemic study of leaders’ traits which focuses on a specific set of 
political beliefs concerning conflict, estimation of one’s own power to influence events, and 
the means of pursuing goals (Hudson, 2005, p.10). As such, decision makers utilize these 
beliefs when responding to, and interpreting, political interaction (Renshon, 2008). Within the 
Operational Code construct, two types of beliefs are acknowledged: philosophical beliefs 
concerning the nature of the political realm and the context for appropriate action, and 
instrumental beliefs concerning the selection of strategy and tactics employed to achieve goals 
(Walker, Schafer & Young, 2003). However, before turning to the Operational Code 
construct, the theoretical work on beliefs and belief systems will be explored. This sections 
concludes by exploring two suggested catalysts of belief change and their predicted effects on 
Xi Jinping’s Operational Code beliefs. 
 
3.1 Beliefs and Belief Systems 
 As argued before, the way we see and interpret the world, and how we see or picture 
our own place in the world, is influenced by our belief systems. Early scholars of Operational 
Code beliefs followed Converse’s 1964 definition of a belief system as “a configuration of 
ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or 
functional interdependence” (Converse, 2006, p.3). This definition allowed for assumptions of 
cognitive stability theory to apply to an actor’s Operational Code belief system. Cognitive 
consistency theory is a social-psychological theory that assumes individual beliefs to constrain 
behavior, and assumes harmony to exist between these beliefs (Holsti, 1976, p.26). Cognitive 
consistency theory postulates three assumptions about belief systems. The first assumption is 
that beliefs are internally consistent. Under this assumption, humans are perceived as 
“consistency seekers” who strive for coherence among their different beliefs regarding the 
world (Rosenberg, 1986, p.735). Related to this is the second assumption of cognitive 
consistency theory, which states that beliefs are temporarily stable, or stable over time, due to 
the tendency of decision-makers to either fit incoming information into already existing 
images or to ignore it as the basis for decisions and act accordingly to previously held beliefs 
(Holsti, 1962, p.245). The last assumption of cognitive stability theory is that beliefs are 
hierarchically organized. Beliefs vary along a central-peripheral dimension, where the central 
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core beliefs influence less fundamental peripheral beliefs (Rosenberg, 1986, p.735). George, 
guided in his thinking by cognitive consistency theory and assuming philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs to be mutually constitutive, argues that the first philosophical belief, 
regarding the nature of political life, is a master, or central/core/key belief (these all refer to a 
belief from which’s content other beliefs flow, and are theoretically and empirically linked to 
(Schafer & Walker, 2006, p.33)), that influences all other beliefs (George, 1969, p.201-202). 
Because peripheral beliefs were presumed to be more change-prone than core beliefs, when a 
core belief does change, a change of peripheral beliefs in the corresponding direction was 
presumed happen in order to maintain internal consistency (George, 1969, pp.217-218). 
One assumption that dominated the study of beliefs for a long time was that new 
information is processed according to previously held beliefs (Jervis, 1976). For a long time, 
beliefs were presumed to be relatively stable and both the structure and content of belief 
systems regarded as integral (Holsti, 1962, p.244). George, even in assuming beliefs to be 
generally stable over time, argues that belief systems can undergo change under “certain 
conditions” (George, 1969, p.216). The fallibility of cognitive consistency assumptions 
allowed for varying views on belief stability, although theoretical work on belief stability 
remains inconclusive and argues that “beliefs generally remain stable, except when they do 
not” (Renshon, 2008, p.837). Therefore, Operational Code analysis can contribute to the 
discussion of belief stability by detecting changes and continuity in the Operational Codes of 
leaders, as well as produce a better understanding of foreign policy decision making (Feng, 
2005, p.653). 
 
3.2 The Operational Code Construct 
The Operational Code construct was first developed by Nathan Leites, who conducted 
studies on individual principles of political strategy and tactics that characterized the 
Bolshevik approach to politics. Alexander George reexamined the concept of Operational 
Code in his 1969 article The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision-Making. George argued that the Operational Code refers to an 
individual’s held beliefs, with regards to issues of history and politics, that help shape norms, 
standards and guidelines that influence decision-making (George, 1969, p.191). George 
proposes two types of beliefs within Operational Code: instrumental beliefs, which are beliefs 
about end-means relationships in the context of political action; and philosophical beliefs 
which refer to assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of politics, political conflict and 
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the role of the individual in shaping history (George, 1969, pp.198-199). Renshon (2008, 
p.841) adds to this that the instrumental beliefs constitute an individual’s identity, or the Self, 
while philosophical beliefs flow from the position of the actor in the broader political context, 
thus constituting beliefs regarding the Other in political interaction. George used Leites’ 
results to formulate five questions on philosophical beliefs, and five questions on instrumental 
beliefs. Answers to these questions allow for the constitution of an actor’s Operational Code 
belief system (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998; Figure 1). 
 
 Figure 1. George’s Ten Indices 
 
 Source: George (1969) 
 
 
3.3 Operational Code (In)Stability 
There appears to be a divide between Operational Code analysts, and scholars 
following the political-psychological approach of cognitive consistency theory that postulates 
beliefs to be stable over time because humans are assumed to be “consistency seekers” who 
internalize or reject information according to pre-existing beliefs (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 
1999, p.612). Empirical studies employing Operational Code analysis yielded results that 
directly contradict consistency theory’s assumption of belief stability and the presumed 
consistency between philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Herrmann, 1988). Both Walker 
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(1977) and Crichlow (1998) found significant changes in the philosophical beliefs of Henry 
Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin absent of corresponding changes in instrumental beliefs. 
Herrmann (1988, p.184) argues that personality determines both the image of Other and the 
prescribed tactics for Self. Resulting from insights flowing from empirical studies, autonomy, 
rather than interdependence, was assumed to exist between philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs (Walker et al., 1998, p.186). Therefore, belief systems were redefined within the field 
of Behavioral IR as a set of alternative “states of mind” that form an independent 
understanding of Self and Other within political interaction (Walker et al., 1998, p.176; 
Malici, 2006, p.133). The new definition of a ‘belief system’ allowed for: 1) incoherence 
among beliefs regarding self-other relationships; 2) differentiation of beliefs within an 
individual by issue domain; 3) the possibility of learning, defined by Levy (1994, p.283) as “a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”; 
and finally, 4) a “default” state of mind, which can be seen as the self-identity in the absence 
of exogenous influences (Walker et al., 1998, p.176). Because of the recognition of the 
independence between philosophical and instrumental beliefs, researchers no longer followed 
the postulates derived from cognitive consistency theory that presumed a completely 
hierarchical and internally coherent belief system (Walker et al., 1998, p.177). However, 
Walker et al. (1998, pp.177-178) nevertheless assume some form of hierarchy within 
Operational Code beliefs, arguing that I-1 (Strategic approach to goals) and P-1 (Nature of the 
political universe) are key beliefs that determine the balance between cooperative and 
conflictual attributions to Self and Others, and help shape the other instrumental (determined 
by I-1) or philosophical (determined by P-1) beliefs. 
A pivotal study dealing with belief stability is that of Renshon (2008). Results from 
comparing George W. Bush’s Operational Code beliefs over four phases in his political career 
provided strong indications that both role change and exogenous shock exert learning effects 
on belief systems. Furthermore, Renshon argues that the direction of change is an important 
factor to take into account in Operational Code analysis, as change either reinforces or 
reverses a, for example, conflictual view of the political universe, making it more conflictual 
(reinforcement) or move in the direction of cooperation (reversal) (Renshon, 2008, p.826). 
The specific effects of role change and exogenous shock found by Renshon are discussed in 
their corresponding sections below. 
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3.3.1 Role Change 
One suggested catalyst of learning is role change (Barnett, 1993, p.274). A useful 
definition of a role is provided by Rosenau (1990, p.212), who argues that roles encompass 
“attitudinal and behavioral expectations that those who relate to its occupant have of the 
occupant and the expectations that the occupant has of himself or herself in the role”. The idea 
that assuming a leadership position might affect an individual’s belief system was tested by 
Renshon (2008) and by Feng (2009). Renshon compared George W. Bush’s beliefs before 
assuming presidency in January 2001 to his beliefs during his first eight months in office, just 
prior to 9/11. He found statistically significant change in Bush’s P-1 (Nature of the Political 
Universe) and P-2 (Realization of Political Values) beliefs, both reinforcing his optimistic 
worldview (Renshon, 2008, pp.834-835). Renshon (2008, p.841) argues that instrumental 
beliefs, which constitute the identity of the Self, are less prone to change than philosophical 
beliefs, which are the result of “reality-testing” about how Others exercise power in the 
international system (Levy, 1994, pp.283-284). Another study concerned with belief change 
as a result of role change is that of Feng (2009). In this study, the I-1, P-1 and P-4 beliefs of 
Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were compared in their shift from subordinate, to 
head-positions in the Chinese government. Both of these leaders viewed the political universe 
(P-1) as more conflictual, as well as experiencing greater confidence in their abilities to 
control historical development (P-4) as a result of their role changes (Feng, 2009, pp.331-
332). Feng argues, therefore, that Chinese leaders display different beliefs depending on their 
role, and that these are more conflictual when the leader is in a position of total power (Feng, 
2009, p.332). 
In the sociological role theory it is similarly argued that the more institutionalized the 
guides to action are, the more a role will influence behavior (Barnett, 1993). Leaders, in 
exercising their roles, experience certain expectations set by themselves, as well as by others, 
which influence, but do not determine, behavior (Barnett, 1993, pp.274-276). Behavior, 
Keohane (1989, pp.163-164) argues, is a function of two attitudes: one toward an actor, and 
one towards the situational circumstances of the actor. In role theory, actors are assumed to be 
guided by these expectations, which are shaped through experience based on social interaction 
(Nabers, 2011, p.74). Post (2005) makes a distinction between personality influence and role 
prescription influence on behavior. Expectations of the Self are formed incrementally through 
a lifetime of experiences, and flow from the actor’s personality. Post (2005, p.76) argues that 
personality is stable over time and relatively stable across roles because it consists of all 
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accumulated life experiences. How the leader perceives Others’ expectations regarding his/her 
role is continuously reconstructed by the current social environment, thus constituting his 
perceived role prescription (Post, 2005, p.56; see Figure 2). However, due to the relative 
stability of the personality, behavioral changes are foremost ascribed to alteration in the role 
prescription, as “behavior is patterned to fit the expectations of Others” (Holsti, 1970, p.236). 
 
Figure 2. Variables Relevant to the Study of Personality and Politics 
 
 Source: Post (2005) 
 
When combining the assumptions of role theory with findings from Operational Code 
analysis, an interesting insight into the influence of role on belief systems emerges. In 
Operational Code analysis, actors’ behavior is assumed to match their public beliefs (Walker 
et al., 2003, p.153). Post (2005) argues, guided by role theory, that both personality and role 
prescription influence a leader’s behavior. Whereas Renshon (2008) argues that instrumental 
beliefs are shaped by the identity of the actor, Post argues in a similar fashion that a lifetime 
of experiences have incrementally formed an actor’s personality. Likewise, Renshon argues 
that the philosophical beliefs are based on the conception of the Other in political interaction, 
which matches Post’s assumption that the perceived expectations of Other shape a leader’s 
role prescription (Renshon, 2008, p.841; Post, 2005, p.56). Therefore, both identity and 
personality apply to a leader’s instrumental beliefs, with the stability presumed in cognitive 
theory flowing from the aggregate of intrinsic experiences adopted by the actor’s belief 
system (Post, 2005, p.72), while the conception of Other and role prescription show 
accordance with the philosophical beliefs. 
 When considering the above mentioned literature, a theoretical prediction can be made 
regarding potential change in Xi Jinping’s Operational Code beliefs as a result of his role 
change from vice-president to president of the PRC. Following results by Feng (2009) and 
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Renshon (2008), combined with insights from role theory, changes in Xi’s belief system due 
to role change are expected to take place in the philosophical rather than the instrumental 
beliefs, and change will take the direction of increased conflict. 
 
3.3.2 Exogenous Shock 
 Tetlock offers a definition of an exogenous shock as “anything that falls outside the 
expert’s framework” (Tetlock, 2005, p.131). Results of studies have indicated that leaders do 
undergo belief change when experiencing exogenous shock, however most of these studies 
use the terms key event, external event or traumatic event to mean the same thing. In this 
study, the preferred definition is that of Charles Hermann, who argues that “external shocks 
are large events in terms of visibility and immediate impact on the recipient. They cannot be 
ignored, and they can trigger major foreign policy change” (Hermann, 1990, p.12). Although 
exogenous shock has been mostly found to affect philosophical beliefs, studies have also 
shown instrumental beliefs to change alongside them. Larson (1994, p.21) argues that 
instrumental beliefs prescribe strategy and tactics, and that these beliefs are influenced by 
experience and learning. Walker et al. (1998) detected a reversal of Carter’s optimistic views 
of the political universe (P-1, P-2) after the Afghanistan War. Carter’s instrumental beliefs 
changed too, as I-1 and I-5Appeal decreased and the shift propensities I-4a and I-4b 
increased. Lyndon B. Johnson’s Operational Code beliefs had changed after the Vietnam war, 
influencing his P-4, P-5, I-3 and I-5Appeal beliefs (Walker & Schafer, 2000, p.537). Malici 
(2006), in assessing Ronal Reagan’s Operational Code beliefs during the Cold War, found 
change in the philosophical (P-1, P-2) as well as instrumental (I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4a and I-
5Appeal/Oppose/Resist) indices (Malici, 2006, p.140). Bush, having first become more 
optimistic in his role change to president of the United States, underwent a reversal in his first 
three philosophical beliefs when 9/11 made him view the world as more conflictual and 
hostile (Renshon, 2008, pp.834-835). In his discussion, Renshon offers support for the notion 
by Tetlock (2005, pp.131-132) that change in beliefs due to exogenous shock will attenuate 
slightly over time (Renshon, 2008, p.839). However, Tetlock (2005, p.131) also argues that 
belief systems rigidize in response to exogenous shock. Renshon found no support for this 
notion, but rather argues that exogenous shock “may cause a severe reversal of certain key 
beliefs in the shorter term and that those initially severe changes may become slightly 
attenuated as the new belief system is consolidated over a longer period of time” (Renshon, 
2008, p.839). 
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 Contemporary literature revolving around belief stability seem to support the notion 
that crisis events influence individual belief systems in important ways (Robison, 2006, 
p.102). Studies have indicated that philosophical beliefs seem to be more change-prone than 
instrumental beliefs (Renshon, 2008, p.287). Furthermore, as argued by Horowitz et al. (2015, 
p.41), military successes mostly result in increased aggression. Changes, however, might 
attenuate slightly as the belief system consolidates, as suggested by Renshon (2008) and 
Tetlock (2005). Therefore, the expectation surrounding the effects of exogenous shock on 
Xi’s belief system has two parts. First, Xi will show change in his philosophical, rather than 
his instrumental beliefs, in the direction of increased conflict. Second, indices that changed 
due to exogenous shock will return slightly toward pre-crises levels in time. 
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4. Method 
 
4.1 Case Selection 
In order to provide an answer to the research question What are the direct effects of 
role change and the short-term and long-term effects of exogenous shock on a political 
leader’s belief system?, a quantitative content analysis of the speeches and public statements 
of Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), was conducted to infer Xi’s 
Operational Code beliefs. In his theoretical work on learning, Levy (1994) charges scholars of 
belief change to conduct longitudinal studies on individual leaders to “determine whether [..] 
the variation in beliefs is correlated with political position, institutional role, or economic 
interests” and if “they held certain beliefs prior to the occurrence of important historical 
events [..] that are hypothesized to be the sources of learning and current policy preferences” 
(Levy, 1994, p.308). In Operational Code analysis, leaders are studied “at-a-distance” through 
analysis of their verbal behavior, without having direct access to them (Schafer & Walker, 
2006, p.26). The reason for choosing Xi as a case to test for Operational Code stability is that 
Xi underwent both of the potentially change-inducing events considered in this paper: his role 
change from vice-president to president of the PRC in March 2013; and two foreign policy 
crises in the summer of 2014, of which I argue they cannot be classified as traumatic events 
per se, but fall under the same category as exogenous shocks defined as “[events] that were 
either unexpected at the time or unpredictable in retrospect” (Levy, 1994, p.305). The events 
will be elaborated upon further in this section. By assessing Xi’s Operational Codes 
longitudinally over four distinct periods in his political career (see Table 1), this study will 
contribute to the theory of Operational Code stability by detecting potential changes in Xi’s 
belief system caused by learning effects of role change and exogenous shock. 
 
4.2 Structure of the Study 
As mentioned before, Renshon’s (2008) article on stability and change in George W. 
Bush’s belief system is considered a pivotal contribution to this study. Inspired by his work, 
this article examines four specific phases in Xi Jinping’s political career to test for changes 
induced by role change and exogenous shock. Although Renshon uses the verbal descriptor 
categories of Appendix B to evaluate change, noting that changes of small magnitude “[do] 
not move the Verbs in Context System (VICS) score into a different verbal category” 
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(Renshon, 2008, p.844), change is evaluated purely on the yardstick of statistical significance 
(p ≤.05) in this study. The rationale flows from Walker, Schafer and Young (2003) and Malici 
and Malici (2005). Walker et al. (2003, p.156) note that the verbal descriptor assigned to any 
belief is simply the one closest to its score. For example, for the first instrumental belief, 
Direction of Strategy, all values between +.625 and +.875 classify as having a very 
cooperative direction of strategy. In case of a reversal in the I-1 belief, a score of +.83 would 
have to undergo far greater change than a score of +.66 to achieve the “major shift” 
articulated by Renshon (2008, p.836). Therefore, Malici and Malici (2005) advocate the use 
of using statistical significance to exclude random chance, in order to draw conclusions with 
more confidence. The verbal descriptor categories acts as a means to conceptualize 
differences in beliefs, and are therefore deemed useful tools in studies with a purely 
substantive focus (Renshon, 2009, p.657). However, in studies with a theoretical focus, aimed 
at detecting incremental change within the same leader longitudinally, the verbal descriptor 
categories are not deemed an appropriate judging means of the magnitude of change, and 
serve as an interpretation of the scores rather than a hard measure of change (Walker et al., 
2003, p.155). 
 The statistical data used to measure belief change is gathered using the Verbs In 
Context System (VICS), developed by Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). Following this 
development, Operational Code research shifted to quantitative analysis in order to construct 
belief patterns from leaders’ public statements. Belief systems can be inferred from speeches 
because leaders reveal much about their beliefs concerning the exercise of power in the way 
they address balances of power in their political environments (Schafer & Walker, 2006, 
p.30). Specifically, VICS focuses on utterances made by actors in their speeches. An 
utterance is a part of a sentence containing a transitive verb, which means that the sentence 
denotes an action, and a recipient of that action. All detected utterances in verbal material are 
assigned scores on a scale ranging from -3 to +3, which are categorized under the following 
verbs and their corresponding weight on the scale: Punish (-3), Threaten (-2), Oppose (-1), 
Support (+1), Promise (+2), and Reward (+3) (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p.32). An important 
first step in coding done with VICS, is that a distinction is made between utterances in which 
the actor is talking about an Other in the political universe, or about Self. As mentioned 
before, the Operational Code knows two types of beliefs: philosophical beliefs that signify 
how the actor views the political universe and others, and instrumental beliefs about the 
actor’s own approach to political action. Therefore, utterances in which the subject is Self 
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constitute the actor’s instrumental beliefs, while utterances in which the subject is Other 
constitute the actor’s philosophical beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p.31). In the second step, 
VICS codes utterances for directionality and intensity. In coding for directionality, an 
utterance is identified as either cooperative (+) or conflictual (-). Utterances are coded for 
intensity as either words or deeds. Deeds indicate the actual exercise of power as either 
Rewards (cooperative +3) or Punishments (conflictual -3). Words indicate the potential use of 
power as either threats, promises or expressions of authority, and are scaled with lower 
intensity ranging from -2 to +2. The VICS coding procedure is illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
 Figure 3. Steps in the Verbs In Context System 
 
 Source: Walker, Schafer & Young (2003) 
 
 VICS is applied through the automated content-analysis program Profiler Plus v7.3.2, 
a software program developed by Michael Young and provided by Social Science Automation 
Inc. which isolates all verbs and subjects from texts. Profiler Plus, in its outcomes, offers data 
only of the P-1, P-2, I-1 and I-2 indices. However, when requested, Michael Young will 
provide the Operational Code coding scheme with the built in formulas for calculating the 
other philosophical and instrumental indices. This coding scheme was applied in this study. 
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4.3 Selection of Material 
 The material used to infer Xi’s Operational Code beliefs consists of speeches and 
public statements. The logic here is that subjects’ verbal behavior is indicative of their “states 
of mind”, and that the things they say and the way they say it in expose intrinsic 
psychological characteristics (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p.26). As mentioned before, 
individuals engage in different “states of mind” depending on the domain they are dealing 
with. Therefore, Walker et al. (2003, pp.152-153) task scholars employing Operational Code 
analysis to select only verbal material concerning foreign policy in inferring leaders’ belief 
systems, rather than verbal material concerning domestic politics. Furthermore, Schafer and 
Walker (2006, pp.43-44) argue that, in order for the VICS to produce meaningful values on 
the indices, verbal material should consist of at least 1,500 words, which yield at least 15-20 
coded verbs. 
The at-a-distance approach of Operational Code analysis has raised certain critiques 
regarding the validity of using speeches and public statements to infer beliefs. Most notably, 
scholars question whether speeches are truly indicative of leaders’ beliefs, or whether 
speeches are subject to manipulation and deception (He & Feng, 2013, p.223). Renshon 
(2009) has tested the validity of using public speeches in Operational Code analysis, and 
found that public material and spontaneous material are both indicative of leaders’ beliefs. 
Although manipulation and deception are recognized as implications of using public speeches 
in general (Schafer & Walker, 2006, pp.46-47), these are not considered issues for this 
particular study. The reason for this is that Chinese heads of government have always been 
the most important, if not sole, foreign policy setters, and they have, and are used to give, 
final consent on their speeches (He & Feng, 2013, pp.222-223). Authorship can be presumed 
to lie with the chief executive, as these are the result of their own intellectual making or of 
consulting others for advice. The contents of multiple speeches provide scholars with the 
balanced beliefs held by each leader (Walker et al., 1999, p.613). 
 
4.4 Data Selection 
 In order to detect change in Xi Jinping’s Operational Code beliefs due to learning 
effects of role change and exogenous shock, the four time periods in Table 1 were examined. 
 
 
19 
 
Table 1. Time Periods Examined 
 
 
The material consists of Xi’s speeches and public statements concerning foreign policy and 
were mainly retrieved either from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China (www.fmprc.gov.cn), or from Chinese national news agencies 
accessed via websites of Chinese diplomatic missions. Profiler Plus v7.3.2 currently only 
codes English material. The reason for retrieving speeches from the website of the Foreign 
Ministry is that these speeches are official translations by the Chinese government, and are 
therefore regarded by Feng and He (2018, p.181) as the most authoritative sources. Although 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry is selective in what speeches they translate and release, He and 
Feng argue that the Chinese Foreign Ministry is obligated to publish the speeches concerning 
foreign policy by Chinese top leaders, especially Politburo members, on their website (He & 
Feng, 2015, p.414). The validity of using Xi’s speeches for analysis is even higher than using 
those of his predecessors, because “Xi waged a large-scale and still-ongoing, anti-corruption 
campaign in China soon after he came to power in late 2012” and thus strives for more 
transparency in the Chinese Foreign Ministry (He, 2016, p.147) 
 The first period under examination comprises of the years 2010-2012. Xi became 
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the 18th CCP Congress on 
November 15, 2012, which marked his official ascent to power even prior to his inauguration 
as president of the PRC in March 2013 (He & Feng, 2013, p.223). Because the goal of this 
study is to compare Xi’s beliefs before and after his ascent to top leadership, the first time 
period ends November 14, 2012, one day prior to his appointment as General Secretary of the 
CCP. Although the actual role change had not yet taken place, the role change as perceived 
by Xi might already have been affecting his pre-presidential beliefs (Lee, 2018, p.10). This 
period yielded eight speeches that met qualifications. 
 The second time period measures Xi’s Operational Code beliefs in the first thirteen 
months after assuming presidency in March 2013. This time period serves two purposes. The 
first is that effects of role change are measured by comparing Xi’s beliefs from this period to 
his pre-presidential beliefs. The second use of this time period is that it serves as a baseline to 
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compare Xi’s Operational Code beliefs after experiencing the 2014 foreign policy crises 
against. This period ends just prior to the first foreign policy crisis in May, 2014. Twelve 
speeches were gathered for this period. 
 Time period three starts September 1, 2014. In this period, the effects of experiencing 
exogenous shock are measured, as the full extent of two international conflicts left their mark 
on Xi’s belief system. The first crisis Xi experienced was the Oil Rig Crisis with Vietnam 
from May to July 2014. China National Offshore Oil Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, 
provocatively placed an oilrig in waters over which sovereignty was disputed (He, 2016, 
p.143-144). The crisis reached its climax when Chinese authorities deployed police vessels as 
Vietnamese boats tried to disrupt the deployment of the oilrig. However, Chinese State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi was sent to Vietnam with the goal of de-escalation, which led to the 
early Chinese withdrawal of the rig (He, 2016). He argues that “the oil rig crisis not only 
caught the outside world off guard, but also surprised China’s foreign ministry” (He, 2016, 
p.144). In August 2014, another international conflict erupted after a Chinese J-11 fighter 
aircraft made dangerous passes underneath a U.S. Navy P-8 plane, just some days before 
planned military negotiations between the two states. In response, Xi initiated negotiations 
about setting “rules of the road” concerning safe conduct in international airspace, eventually 
resulting in deepened confidence-building mechanisms between China and the U.S. (He, 
2016). Xi’s involvement in the P-8 Incident is assumed because, due to his position as 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the military would not act autonomously 
without Xi’s consent (He, 2016, p.146). Although Xi’s level of involvement in the onset of 
both crises is unclear, the outcomes are the same. When the disputes became foreign policy 
crises, it was up to Xi to decide how to tackle the problems as the top leader in China’s 
foreign policy (He, 2016). Fourteen speeches were gathered for this period. 
 For the last time period, ten speeches were gathered throughout the year 2017. This 
period serves as a test of Renshon’s (2008, p.839) assumption that when beliefs change due to 
exogenous shock, these changes tend to revert in time. By comparing Phase 4 to Phase 2, Xi’s 
Operational Code beliefs from before the 2014 crises are compared to his more consolidated 
Operational Code beliefs of 2017. Renshon, in testing for attenuation of beliefs, extended the 
period directly following 9/11 with an additional twelve months. I argue, however, that the 
means from the initial eight months following 9/11 distort the attenuating effects predicted by 
Tetlock (2005) over the entire period. Therefore, Phase 4 serves as an examination of belief 
stability in the absence of both role change and exogenous shock.   
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5. Results 
 
 The results from this study are represented in Tables 2 and 3 below. The results of 
testing for effects of role change and the immediate effects of exogenous shock are 
represented in Table 2. Here, the difference in means between Phase 1 and Phase 2, and Phase 
2 and Phase 3, illustrate changes between the examined periods in the quantitative answers to 
George’s five questions on philosophical beliefs, and the five questions on instrumental 
beliefs, as produced by the VICS (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p.8). In Table 3, Phase 4 is 
compared to Phase 2 in order to assess how Xi’s Operational Code beliefs differed in 2017 as 
compared to his first 13 months in office. This tests Renshon’s (2008, pp.839-841) and 
Tetlock’s (2005, p.131) suggestion that exogenous shock may cause severe change in key 
beliefs in the shorter term, but that these changes revert as the new belief system consolidates 
in time. This study maintains a confidence level of p ≤.05 to signify significant change. 
Indices that underwent change at this confidence level are in bold with their corresponding T-
values. As mentioned before, although not considered an appropriate measure to determine 
the magnitude of change, the verbal descriptor categories are still considered resourceful 
means to determine directionality of the Operational Code indices. The verbal descriptor 
categories are presented in Appendix B. 
 
5.1  Measuring Role Change: From Vice-President to President of the People’s 
 Republic of China 
First, the effects of role change are measured by comparing Phase 2 to Phase 1 using 
statistical analysis. These results represent how Xi’s Operational Code beliefs differed after 
assuming presidency in March 2013, as compared to his pre-presidential beliefs of 2010-
2012. The results show that three out of a possible sixteen indices underwent significant 
change: P-1 (Nature of the Political Universe), P-2 (Realization of Political Values), and P-3 
(Predictability of Political Future). Xi’s view of the political universe (P-1) became more 
hostile when he took office, and changed from +.74 to +.63 (t(17.044)=-2.413, p=.027, r=.50), 
both of which classify as having a very friendly view of the political universe in the verbal 
descriptor categories of Appendix B. P-2 decreased from +.51 to +.40 (t(17.982)=-2.747, 
p=.013, r=.54), both of which can be interpreted as having a definitely optimistic view on the 
realization of political values. Lastly, P-3 changed from .22 to .18 (t(11.967)=-2.435, p=.032, 
r=.58), which are both classified as regarding the predictability of the political future as low.  
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Table 2. Xi Jinping’s Operational Codes in Phase 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
As Table 2 indicates, all statistically significant shifts took place in the philosophical, 
rather than instrumental beliefs. The assumption that role change is likely to affect the 
philosophical rather than the instrumental beliefs is one supported by Renshon’s (2008) study 
of George W. Bush’s Operational Code beliefs, who found change significant at p ≤.1 for the 
P-1 and P-2 indices. These results also comply with those of Feng (2009), who found 
increased conflict orientation in Chinese top leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao after their 
ascent to top leadership. The results will be taken up further in the Discussion & Conclusion 
section. 
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5.2  Measuring Exogenous Shock: the Effects of the 2014 Foreign Policy Crises 
By comparing Phase 3 to Phase 2, the effects of four months of crises are tested to 
determine steering effects of exogenous shock. The results seem to directly contradict the 
notion that philosophical beliefs are more prone to change than instrumental beliefs, as the 
only change that took place was within the instrumental indices. Four instrumental indices 
showed change significant at p ≤.05, two of which also reached significance at p ≤.01 (I-2 and 
I-4a). I-1 (Strategic Approach to Goals) decreased from +.83 to +.66 (t(23.672)=-2.762, 
p=.011, r=.49), both of which illustrate a very cooperative direction of strategy. I-2 (Tactical 
Pursuit of Goals) decreased from +.41 (definitely cooperative intensity of tactics) to +.27 
(somewhat cooperative intensity of tactics) (t(22.837)=-3.460, p=.002, r=.59). Xi’s I-4a 
belief, concerning the diversity of choices in terms of cooperation or conflict, indicated 
greater flexibility of tactics as it increased from .17 to .34 (t(23.672)=2.789, p=.01, r=.50). 
Both of these values indicate low flexibility between conflictual/cooperative action. Finally, 
Xi showed a decrease in the use of Rewards (I-5) from .17 to .11 (t(23.999)=-2.274, p=.032, 
r=.42). Both indicate a medium regard of the utility of rewards in the verbal descriptor 
categories. These results offer support for the assumption that exogenous shock causes severe 
reversal of prior beliefs (Renshon, 2008, p.839). 
 
5.3 Measuring Belief Attenuation 
The suggestion made by Renshon that exogenous shock may cause severe reversal of 
beliefs, but that these changes attenuate over time (Renshon, 2008, p.839) is tested by 
comparing Phase 4 to Phase 2. The results of this comparison are presented in Table 3. In 
order to provide statistical support for the attenuation of beliefs, no statistical difference 
should exist between Phase 2 and Phase 4. If statistical difference does occur, however, the 
notion of belief recurrence is not supported by results gathered in this study.  
As Table 3 indicates, no change at confidence level p ≤.05 was found in the 
comparison of Xi’s consolidated belief system of 2017 as compared to his pre-crises beliefs of 
his first thirteen months in office. This outcome is an important one, as it provides 
unprecedented statistical support for the notion that changed beliefs bounce back toward their 
original values over time (Renshon, 2008, p.839). These results will be examined further in 
the Discussion & Conclusion section below. 
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Table 3. Xi Jinping’s Operational Codes from Phase 4 Compared to Phase 2 
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6. Discussion & Conclusion 
 
Although the subject has been studied extensively, we are still left with unanswered questions 
as to whether our beliefs change, and what exactly causes beliefs to change. The aim of this 
study is to contribute to the theory of belief stability by exploring the potential learning effects 
of role change and exogenous shock on the belief system of Xi Jinping, president of the 
People’s Republic of China. By employing Operational Code analysis longitudinally, Xi’s 
speeches and public statements over four distinct phases in his political career are compared 
in an attempt to answer the following research question: 
What are the direct effects of role change and the short-term and long-term effects of 
exogenous shock on a political leader’s belief system? 
Before assessing the effects of role change and exogenous shock on Xi’s beliefs, first, 
the results from this study are placed within the broader context of belief stability. The results 
from this study seems to directly contradict aspects of cognitive consistency theory. First, 
belief systems appear to be sensitive to learning effects, which challenges the assumed overall 
stability of belief systems in cognitive consistency theory. Second, Xi’s Operational Code 
beliefs do not appear to be internally consistent, as changes in the philosophical indices 
induced no change in instrumental indices in Phase 2, or vice versa in Phase 3. Lastly, the 
assumption that the first philosophical belief (Nature of the Political Universe) and the first 
instrumental belief (Strategic Approach to Goals) hierarchically determine the content of 
other beliefs is difficult to support or contradict based on the outcomes of this study. Changes 
in both of these key beliefs were accompanied by changes in corresponding other beliefs, 
though not in the large batches predicted by cognitive consistency theory (Jervis, 1976, 
p.170). However, some support can be drawn from the fact that all the changes in 
philosophical indices happened in Phase 2, while all instrumental indices that changed, 
changed in Phase 3. For the indices that showed significant change, P-1 and I-1 were amongst 
them. 
Turning now to the effects of role change on leader’s belief systems, the predicted 
outcome of change in philosophical indices in the direction of increased conflict was 
achieved. This outcome is relevant for the development of Operational Code analysis, as it 
supports the notion that leaders’ view of the political universe and Others may be altered in 
their ascent to top leadership. However, the direction of change might depend on the type of 
leader examined, as argued by Feng (2009). Although the influence of regime type and 
personality type on directionality of role change is beyond the scope of this article, it is an 
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interesting subject for future scholars to examine, as it is relevant in predicting and explaining 
leaders’ behavior. 
In assessing the effects of exogenous shock on belief systems, this study yielded 
results that contradicted the theoretical expectations. Xi’s instrumental beliefs, which 
prescribe strategy and tactics for Self to achieve political goals, showed significant change 
after the Oil Rig Crisis and P-8 Incident of 2014. Although predicted in the philosophical 
indices, change was found only in Xi’s instrumental indices, all indicating increased 
conflictual strategies and tactics employed by the Self. An important differentiation is made in 
this study between exogenous shock and traumatic events. Although comparable in the 
offered definitions, an exogenous shock does not have to be traumatic per se, as beneficial 
results can also emerge from unexpected events. In the case of the Oil Rig Crisis and the P-8 
Incident, China is considered to be both instigator and de-escalator of the events, while Xi 
managed to set a positive image of himself on the international stage as a conciliatory leader 
(He, 2016). Arguably, this increased Xi’s notion of power and strength, thus influencing his 
conception of Self. Changes in the instrumental indices, here, indicate the adoption of 
conflictual strategies and tactics as appropriate means of achieving political goals, while the 
conception of the Other, or the philosophical beliefs, remained unchanged. Future studies of 
key historical events should therefore include unexpected events that yield beneficial 
consequences to assess their effect on instrumental beliefs, rather than regarding exogenous 
shock to be exclusively linked to traumatic and detrimental consequences. 
Most notable, however, are the results gathered from assessing the durability of 
change due to exogenous shock. Renshon’s (2008, p.839) suggestion that beliefs undergo 
severe reversal due to exogenous shock, but that these beliefs attenuate slightly over time, 
seems fully supported by comparing Xi’s beliefs before the crises (Phase 2) to his beliefs 
roughly four years later (Phase 4). Whereas the instrumental indices I-1, I-2, I-4a and I-5 
Reward all became more conflict-oriented in Phase 3 due to the 2014 crises, none of the 
indices measured in 2017 showed significant change at p ≤.05 when compared to Xi’s pre-
event beliefs. The idea that belief change reverts over time, however, is only just touched 
upon by Renshon (2008) and Tetlock (2005), and lacks theoretical and empirical foundation. 
Adding to the complexity, Renshon (2008) found no change in instrumental indices after 9/11, 
and attenuation of the philosophical changes was only of small magnitude. Therefore, the 
notion of belief change reversion is in dire need of further exploration, as change attenuation 
in both philosophical and instrumental beliefs is potentially pivotal to the study of belief 
stability.  
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Appendix A: Speeches Included in the Study 
 
 
 
Time Period 1: 2010-2012 (N=8) 
 
2010.04.10 Work Together for Asia’s Green and Sustainable Development  
 Word count: 2,397 
http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/zgxw/t678705.htm  
 
2010.06.21 Joining Hands to Raise the Sino-Australian Economic and Trade Cooperation 
 to a New Level  
 Word count: 1,801 
https://aiacf.org.au/en/a%EF%BF%BDe%EF%BF%BDaaa%EF%BF%BDc%EF%BF%BDea
ae%EF%BF%BDa%EF%BF%BDae%EF%BF%BDasascs%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%
BDe%EF%BF%BDa%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD/ 
 
2010.09.07 Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, Vice President of the People’s Republic of 
China at the World Investment Forum 2010 
 Word count: 2,225 
http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90785/7132915.html 
 
2012.02.15 Work Together for a Bright Future of China-US Cooperative Partnership 
 Word count: 2,180 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t910351.shtml  
 
2012.02.17 Take a Long-Term Perspective and Work Together for new Progress in China-
US Cooperation 
 Word count: 2,546 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t910355.shtml 
 
2012.02.20 Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping Vice President of the People’s Republic of China at 
the China-Ireland Trade and Investment Forum 
 Word count: 1,795 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/gjlb_664408/3316
_664590/3318_664594/t910353.shtml 
 
2012.02.22 Vice President Xi Jinping’s Speech at the China-Turkey Economic and Trade 
Cooperation 
 Word count: 1,651 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/289
8_663796/2900_663800/t908616.shtml 
 
2012.09.21 Work Together Towards Deeper Cooperation and Sustained Development 
 Word count: 2,419 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t977453.shtml 
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Time Period 2: 2013.03.14 - 2014.04.30 (N=12) 
 
2013.03.19 President Xi Jinping Gives Joint Interview to Media from BRICS Countries 
 Word count: 3,915 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1023070.shtml  
 
2013.03.23 Follow the Trend of the Times and Promote Peace and Development in the 
World 
 Word count: 2,803 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1033246.shtml 
 
2013.03.25 Trustworthy Friends and Sincere Partners Forever 
 Word count: 2,939 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1027951.shtml 
 
2013.04.07  Working Together Toward a Better Future for Asia and the World 
 Word count: 2,373 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1030610.shtml 
 
2013.05.31 President Xi Jinping Gives a Joint Written Interview to the Media of Trinidad 
and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico 
 Word count: 3,058 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1046931.shtml 
 
2013.06.05 Seek Common Development to Create a Better Future 
 Word count: 2,837 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1051157.shtml 
 
2013.09.07  Promote Friendship between our People and Work Together to Build a Bright 
Future  
 Word count: 2,255 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml 
 
2014.03.24 Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at 
the Nuclear Security Summit 
 Word count: 1,655 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1140583.shtml 
 
2014.03.27 Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the 
Meeting Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-
France Diplomatic Relations 
 Word count: 2,739 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1147894.shtml 
 
2014.03.28a Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at 
UNESCO Headquarters 
 Word count: 2,996 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1142560.shtml 
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2014.03.28b Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the 
Körber Foundation 
 Word count: 2,759 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1148640.shtml 
 
2014.04.01 Speech at the College of Europe 
 Word count: 3,241 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxdsjhaqhfbfwhlfgdgblshlhgjkezzzbo
mzb_666590/t1144230.shtml 
 
 
Time Period 3: 2014.09.01 - 2016.03.30 (N=14) 
 
2014.09.12 Working Together with Sincerity and Dedication to Take SCO to a New Level 
 Word count: 1,923 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1192339.shtml 
 
2015.04.21 Building a China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny to Pursue Closer 
Win-Win Cooperation 
 Word count: 3,243 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1257158.shtml 
 
2015.07.09 Building Partnership Together Toward a Bright Future 
 Word count: 1,732 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1283789.shtml 
 
2015.07.10 Strengthening Shanghai Cooperation Organization Through Unity, Mutual 
Support and Joint Response to Challenges 
 Word count: 1,985 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1283794.shtml 
 
2015.09.22 Address by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the 
China-US Governors’ Forum 
 Word count: 1,861 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305411.shtml 
 
2015.09.23 Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the 
Welcoming Dinner Hosted by Local Governments and Friendly Organizations 
in the United States 
 Word count: 4,246 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305429.shtml 
 
2015.09.28 Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and 
Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind 
 Word count: 2,046 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305051.shtml 
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2015.11.07 Forging a Strong Partnership to Enhance Prosperity of Asia 
 Word count: 3,597 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1313923.shtml 
 
2015.11.15 Innovate Growth that Benefits All 
 Word count: 2,133 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1315058.shtml 
 
2015.11.18 The Leading Role of the Asia-Pacific in Meeting Global Economic Challenges 
 Word count: 2,553 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1316082.shtml 
 
2015.12.04 Open a New Era of China-Africa Win-Win Cooperation and Common 
Development 
 Word count: 2,497 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1321614.shtml 
 
2015.12.05 A Rainbow of Friendship and Cooperation with Greater Splendor 
 Word count: 1,636 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1328502.shtml 
 
2015.12.16 Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the 
Opening Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference 
 Word count: 2,359 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1327570.shtml 
 
2016.01.21 Work Together for a Bright Future of China-Arab Relations 
 Word count: 3,172 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1335484.shtml 
 
 
 
Time Period 4: 2017.01.01 - 2017.12.31 (N=10) 
 
2017.01.17 Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth 
 Word count: 4,420 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1538293.shtml 
 
2017.01.18 Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind 
 Word count: 4,292 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/zywjyjh/t1432250.htm 
 
2017.05.14 Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road 
 Word count: 4,119 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1465819.shtml 
 
2017.06.30 Toast at the Welcome Dinner Held by the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region 
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 Word count: 1,624 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/01/c_136407943.htm 
 
2017.07.01 Address at the Meeting Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong’s 
Return to the Motherland and The Inaugural Ceremony of the Fifth-Term 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
 Word count: 2,997 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/sgxw/newsletters/t1475060.htm 
 
2017.09.03 Working Together to Usher in the Second “Golden Decade” of BRICS 
Cooperation 
 Word count: 3,742 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1489623.shtml 
 
2017.09.05 Strengthening Mutually-Beneficial Cooperation for Common Development 
 Word count: 1,533 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/05/c_136586145.htm 
 
2017.10.18 Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All 
Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era 
 Word count: 25,181 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cejo/eng/dtxw/P020171107148482980205.pdf 
 
2017.11.10 Seizing the Opportunity of a Global Economy in Transition and Accelerating 
Development of the Asia-Pacific 
 Word count: 3,351 
http://ie.china-embassy.org/eng/ztlt/2d2/t1525448.htm 
 
2017.12.01 Working Together to Build a Better World 
 Word count: 3,191 
http://www.chinaembassy.lt/eng/xwdt/t1532294.htm 
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Appendix B: The Verbal Descriptor Categories 
 
Source: Walker, Schafer & Young, 2003 
